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Abstract 
Recently Smartphones have become more robust tools in terms of storage capacity and computing power, effective tools for 
business to improve productivity, and daily tools for many people due to the various services they offer and allow to end users to 
perform multiple tasks and be always updated on the move. This has made it a favorite target for malicious applications that 
specifically attack their personal and professional data. To overcome this problem, mobile platforms have set up a security 
system based on the permissions model; the user decides whether to validate the permissions requested by an application before 
installation, or to abort the installation. In case the user needs to install an application, and that application requests unjustified 
permissions, this represents a particularly troublesome weakness. 
In this paper, we propose a firewall Anti-Leak of Sensitive Data (ALSD), allowing reliable protection against leakage of 
sensitive personal and professional data. This integrated solution to the mobile operating system is based on automated analysis 
of markets; it allows blocking applications query on the sensitive data while ensuring their proper functioning. 
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1. Introduction 
In the third quarter of 2015, global sales of smartphones reached 355.2 million which represents an increase of 
6.8%2, smartphones equipped with the Android system represents 81.2%3, Android devices have gained huge 
market share because of the open architecture of Android, and the popularity of the Android SDK (Software 
Development Kit). The success of this platform is accompanied with a strong rise in malicious Android applications, 
so that our solution will be primarily intended for Android mobile platform. 
Android has set up a very simple security model based on the principle that an application can only access to 
resources expressly authorized by the user, this model delegates to the user the decision to accept or not a potentially 
malicious application, and to assume all his responsibilities. 
The article "Automated analysis of Android markets solution1" offers information about the impact of 
applications on the phone device, stored on a distributed database, and results from a static and dynamic analysis of 
all Android applications markets. Users shall take their decision based on this information; our contribution is to 
automate this operation: the decision will be made by our ALSD firewall instead of the user. 
This paper presents a theoretical study on modeling the ALSD firewall, and defines an approach to integrate it 
within the Android operating system. The first section of this paper is devoted to study the automated analysis 
solution of the Android markets which is used as a source of information for our ALSD firewall, the second section 
introduces the overall pattern of the ALSD firewall, the third section is dedicated to a general comparison between 
the different solutions proposed in this direction, and finally the conclusion of the paper gives multiple perspectives 
to this work. 
2. The automated analysis of Android markets solution (Hooker) 
The automated analysis solution of Android markets (Hooker)1 allows identifying sensitive events that occur on 
the Android system and which are centralized in a dedicated database. The processing of this information and the 
presentation of results is performed intelligently to allow, ultimately, achieving both microscopic and macroscopic 
analysis. The first analysis focuses on the functioning of a particular application; the second tries to find similar 
behaviors to some applications and therefore potentially to a whole market. 
The dynamic analysis method proposed by Hooker is based on Cydia substrate framework4. This allows the API 
hooking when it is injected in memory of each of the applications running on the system. This solution has the main 
advantage of not to be based on any change in upstream, neither at the system level nor at the level of the 
application to analyze. Furthermore, changes to divert the flow of execution are performed only in memory, so it is 
possible to deploy Hooker either on a physical architecture or on a virtual device. 
Sensitive data identified in Hooker1 are initially related to the user personal data: 
• Accessing the location data; 
• Accessing contacts directory; 
• Accessing networks: SMS, calls, Internet, Bluetooth, NFC; 
• Accessing data stored locally by the application: SharedPreferences, databases and embedded resources; 
• Accessing the media: camera, microphone. 
An application analysis by Hooker is divided into several steps shown in Figure 1. 
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Fig. 1.The analysis steps by Hooker 
An application analysis by Hooker begins with a preliminary static analysis using the framework Androguard5. 
Information extracted by the static analysis allows having basic knowledge of the application to analyze simple and 
fast to build. This information is then stored to be completed by the dynamic analysis data. 
The next step is to perform a dynamic analysis of the application based on the framework Cydia Substrate4. This 
framework is used by diversion API on the target system. The events related to its execution are created and sent to 
a listening service on the system. The recording of the parameters and return values of the various functions can 
acquire a lot of information such as the destination IP addresses and encryption key value. In this step, an indicator 
of the indiscreet level is associated with each type of observed event. This indicator is present in order to 
differentiate the most sensitive applications. It is based on the assumption that write access to a resource is often 
indiscreet than read access only. 
The last step is to centralize all these events in a distributed database. The combination of ElasticSearch6 and 
Kibana7software allows searching and returning results in real time on the stored data. 
3. Proposed approach 
Despite all the relevance and accuracy of permissions available to the user before installing any application, they 
do not respond to issues related to security risks that must be asked before accepting the installation or not of an 
application. The most important of these questions are: What proves that this application does not use these 
permissions to exfiltrate my sensitive data to a remote server? What does this application do with the resources it 
requested access permissions? Is it going to abuse their permissions? 
To answer these questions, we set up a firewall named ALSD that will support the monitoring and protection of 
sensitive data. This firewall will use the results of the analysis performed by the system Hooker1: 
• Static analysis based on the study of the application code and inversely; 
• Dynamic analysis based on the study of the application during its execution; 
Both types of analysis can also be combined. Each of these analyzes has a common goal: to obtain information 
on the behavior of the program. These two analysis techniques are employed to provide the most complete and 
precise vision as possible of the application’s impact on the user phone. 
The ALSD firewall must be implanted within the Android operating system (see Fig 2); it must have a minimum 
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Fig.2. Android OS with ALSD firewall 
To ensure the real-time aspect of the protection and the finest management of our solution, we must modify each 
manager that allows an application to access the system data. The big disadvantage of this solution is that we edit 
each part of the framework that allows access to data. This approach involves creating a special component that 
plays the role of a manager called ALSD Firewall that will be responsible of decisions about sensitive data. This 
component is implemented as an Android system that will be launched at startup of the phone to include its load 
time to the overall startup time. This component will interact with the Hooker distributed database1using a mode of 
remote request based on HTTPS. Also, ALSD Firewall implements the algorithm presented in Figure 3. 
 
Fig.3. ALSD Firewall Algorithm 
Different managers must be modified to use our ALSD system service to allow interception of all requests. 
Taking the example of intercepting requests for contacts, an application that wishes to obtain the contact information 
registers with the ContactsContentProvider used as a Singleton. To intercept the request, the 
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ContactsContentProvider must be modified to call our ALSD component before providing information. A decision 
will be taken by ALSD to authorize or not the access to contacts following information provided by the system 
Hooker1 on the application requesting access to contacts. If the request is refused by ALSD, false contact data is 
returned to the application to ensure normal functioning by applying the principle of withholding data8. ALSD will 
use the package name to identify each application to allow finest security applications. 
4. Related work 
Many research works address the problem of mobile application security regarding permission requests during 
the installation time. Nowadays, the user has to either grant all the permissions specified in the manifest file or 
cancel the application’s installation. In fact, the permissions granted during the installation time cannot be changed 
or canceled at runtime. Several solutions are based on context information to increase security in smartphones at 
runtime and limit access to data in some environments9, 10, 11 . Their aim is to prevent access to sensitive information 
such as location sensors, camera images, contact lists, etc. Several frameworks are based on monitoring the flow 
streams especially the data sent to network or some added components that allow changing access rights to data in a 
user predefined policy during installation time or runtime. 
The Paper12 analyzes the different systems of protection of personal private information, subsequently proposes a 
new component integrated to PMP (Privacy Management Platform) named PMP Gatekeeper, the combination of 
this component with the PMP is a better approach for securing and managing the private data, not only to PMP-
Compatible Apps, but also for Legacy Apps without affecting the operating system. 
In paper13, MOSES isolates data software and the Android platform. It defines different security profiles within a 
single smartphone. Each security profile is associated with a set of conditions that control access to applications and 
data. It can be used for realizing a Mobile Device Management solution to manage remotely the security settings of 
a fleet of mobile devices. 
AppGuard14 used to perform a security check at runtime and before executing a dangerous code. Then, according 
to the security policy, a decision is taken to launch an exception if the instruction is not allowed. 
MockDroid15 is a modified version of Android operating system. Its role is to manipulate (or falsify) the data 
requested by the applications by separating the actual data and false data manipulated by the user. Then it simulates 
information that is supported by MockDroid: Location, Internet access, SMS / MMS, calendar and contacts, the 
phone identifier, sending broadcast.  
In paper16, the security model for mobile applications (SMMA) is composed of four distinct levels. The lowest 
level of the model is the physical level and then upwardly by the hardware, the operating system level and the 
application level. These levels of security model each define a separate section of the security model of a mobile 
phone. This model based on abstraction allows the design of a particular mobile security mechanism to focus on one 
area of concern without spending resources to analyze all layers that support its current position in the model. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented the general architecture of the ALSD firewall and its integration into a mobile 
operating system based on Android platform. It provides strong protection against leakage of sensitive data. This 
firewall uses information on the impact degree of an application on the smartphone, provided by the Hooker system 
through a distributed database. 
A study should be conducted on the performance of the firewall and the degree of its impact on the mobile 
operating system. After it will be implemented and integrated into the Framework MPSS16 (Mobile Phone Security 
Scheme) in order to secure the overall mobile environment on all levels. 
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